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BARBARAH. KWASNIK 
ABSTRACT 
THELINK BETWEEN CLASSIFICATION AND KNOWLEDGE is explored. Classi- 
fication schemes have properties that enable the representation of enti- 
ties and relationships in structures that reflect knowledge of the domain 
being classified. The strengths and limitations of four classificatory ap- 
proaches are described in terms of their ability to reflect, discover, and 
create new knowledge. These approaches are hierarchies, trees, para- 
digms, and faceted analysis. Examples are provided of the way in which 
knowledge and the classification process affect each other. 
INTRODUCTION 
Developments in our ability to store and retrieve large amounts of' 
information have stimulated an interest in new ways to exploit this infor- 
mation for advancing human knowledge. This article describes the rela- 
tionship between knowledge representation (as manifested in classifica- 
tions) and the processes of knowledge discovery and creation. How does 
the classification process enable or constrain knowing something or dis- 
covering new knowledge about something? In what ways might we de- 
velop classifications that will enhance our ability to discover meaningful 
information in our data stores? 
The first part of the article describes several representative classifica- 
tory structures-hierarchies, trees, paradigms, and faceted analysis-with 
the aim of identifying how these structures serve as knowledge represen- 
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tations and in what ways they can be used for knowledge discovery and 
creation. The second part of the discussion includes examples from exist- 
ing classification schemes and discusses how the schemes reflect or fail to 
reflect knowledge. 
KNOWLEDGE, THEORY, AND CLASSIFICATION 
Scholars in many fields, from philosophy to cybernetics, have long 
discussed the concept of knowledge and the problems of representing 
knowledge in information systems. The distinction is drawn between 
merely observing, perceiving, or even describing things and truly knowing 
them. To know implies a process of integration of facts about objects and 
the context in which the objects and processes exist. Even in colloquial 
usage, knowledge about someone or something is always expressed in terms 
of deep relationships and meanings as well as its place in time and space. 
To know cars means not only understanding car mechanics but also knowl- 
edge of the interplay of the mechanical processes and perhaps even fac- 
tors such as aesthetics, economics, and psychology. 
The process of knowledge discovery and creation in science has tradi- 
tionally followed the path of systematic exploration, observation, descrip- 
tion, analysis, and synthesis and testing of phenomena and facts, all con- 
ducted within the communication framework of a particular research com- 
munity with its accepted methodology and set of techniques. We know 
the process is not entirely rational but often is sparked and then fueled by 
insight, hunches, and leaps of faith (Bronowski, 1978). Moreover, research 
is always conducted within a particular political and cultural reality (Olson, 
1998). Each researcher and, on a larger scale, each research community 
at various points must gather up the disparate pieces and in some way 
communicate what is known, expressing it in such a way as to be useful for 
further discovery and understanding. A variety of formats exist for the 
expression of knowledge-e.g., theories, models, formulas, descriptive re- 
portage of many sorts, and polemical essays. 
Of these formats, science particularly values theories and models 
because they are a “symbolic dimension of experience as opposed to the 
apprehension of brute fact” (Kaplan, 1963,p. 294) and can therefore be 
symbolically extended to cover new experiences. A theory thus explains 
a particular fact by abstracting the relationship of that fact to other facts. 
Grand, or covering, theories explain facts in an especially eloquent way 
and in a very wide (some would say, universal) set of situations. Thus, 
Darwinian, Marxist, or Freudian theories, for example, attempt to ex- 
plain processes and behaviors in many contexts, but they do so at a high 
level of abstraction. There are relatively few grand theories, however, 
and we rely on the explanatory and descriptive usefulness of more “lo- 
cal” theories-theories that explain a more limited domain but with 
greater specificity. 
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CLASSIFICATIONAS KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 
How are theories built? How does knowledge accumulate and then 
get shaped into a powerful representation? There are, of course, many 
processes involved, but often one of them is the process of classification. 
Classification is the meaningful clustering of experience. The process of 
classification can be used in a formative way and is thus useful during the 
preliminary stages of inquiry as a heuristic tool in discovery, analysis, and 
theorizing (Davies, 1989). Once concepts gel and the relationships among 
concepts become understood, a classification can be used as a rich repre- 
sentation of what is known and is thus useful in communication and in 
generating a fresh cycle of exploration, comparison, and theorizing. 
Kaplan (1963) states that “theory is not the aggregate of the new laws but 
their connectedness, as a bridge consists of girders only in that the girders 
are joined together in a particular way” (p. 297). A good classification 
functions in much the same way that a theory does, connecting concepts 
in a useful structure. If successful, it is, like a theory, descriptive, explana- 
tory, heuristic, fruitful, and perhaps also elegant, parsimonious, and ro- 
bust (Kwasnik, l992b). 
There are many approaches to the process of classification and to the 
construction of the foundation of classification schemes. Each kind of 
classification process has different goals, and each type of classification 
scheme has different structural properties as well as different strengths 
and weaknesses in terms of knowledge representation and knowledge dis- 
covery. The following is a representative sample of some common ap- 
proaches and structures. 
HIERARCHIES 
We have inherited our understanding of hierarchical classifications 
from Aristotle (Ackrill, 1963),who posited that all nature comprised a 
unified whole. The whole could be subdivided, like a chicken leg at the 
joint, into “natural” classes, and each class further into subclasses, and so 
on-this process following an orderly and systematic set of rules of asso- 
ciation and distinction. How do we know what a natural dividing place is, 
and how do we arrive at the rules for division and subdivision? According 
to Aristotle, only exhaustive observation can reveal each entity’s true (es- 
sential) attributes, and only philosophy can guide us in determining the 
necessary and sufficient attributes for membership in any given class. In 
fact, according to Aristotle’s philosophy, it is only when an entity is prop- 
erly classed, and its essential properties identified, that we can say we truly 
know it. This is the aim of science, he claims-i.e., to unambiguously clas- 
sify all phenomena by their essential (true) qualities. 
While Aristotle’s legacy is alive in spirit in modern applications of 
classification, most practitioners recognize that a pure and complete hier- 
archy is essentially possible only in the ideal. Nevertheless, in knowledge 
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domains that have theoretical foundations (such as germ theory in medi- 
cine and the theory of evolution in biology), hierarchies are the preferred 
structures for knowledge representation (see, for example, the excerpt from 
the Medical Subject Headings [MeSH] in Figure 1). 
EYE DISEASES 

CONJUNCTIVAL
DISEASES 

CONJUNCTIVAL
NEOPLASM 
CONJUNCTIVITIS 
CONJUNCTIVITIS,ALLERGIC 
CONJUNCTIVITIS,BACTERIAL. 
OPHTHALMIANEONATORUM 
TRACHOMA 
CONJUNCTIVITIS,VIRAL 
KERATOCONJUNCTIVITIS 
REITER’SDISEASE 
CORNEALDISEASES 

ETC. 

Figure 1. Hierarchy: Excerpt from MeSH (Medical Subject Headings) .* 
Based on the MeSH excerpt in Figure 1,note that hierarchies have strict 
structural requirements: 
Inclmimwss. The top class (in this case, EYEDISEASES)is the most inclu- 
sive class and describes the domain of the classification. The top class 
includes all its subclasses and sub-subclasses. Put another way, all the 
classes in the example are included in the top class: EYEDISEASES. 
Species/diffientia. A true hierarchy has only one type of relationship 
between its super- and subclasses and this is the generic relationship, 
also known as species/differentia, or more colloquially as the is-a rela-
tionship. In a generic relationship, ALLERGIC is aONJUNCTIVITIS 
kind of CONJUNCTIVITIS,which in turn is a kind of CONJUNCTIVAL 
DISEASE,which in turn is a kind of EYEDISEASE. 
Inheritance. This requirement of strict class inclusion ensures that ev-
erything that is true for entities in any given class is also true for enti- 
ties in its subclasses and sub-subclasses. Thus whatever is true of EYE 
DISEASES(as a whole) is also true of CONJUNCTIVAL What-DISEASES. 
ever is true of CONJUNCTIVAL (as a whole) is also true ofDISEASES 
CONJUNCTIVITIS,and so on. This property is called inheritance, that is, 
attributes are inherited by a subclass from its superclass. 
Transitivity. Since attributes are inherited, all sub-subclasses are mem- 
bers of not only their immediate superclass but of every superclass 
above that one. Thus if BACTERIALCONJUNCTIVITISis a kind Of  CON-
JUNCTIVITIS, and CONJUNCTIVITIS is a kind Of CONJUNCTIVAL DISEASE, 
- - 
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then, by the rules of transitivity, BACTERIAL is also aCONJUNCTIVXTIS 
kind of CONJUNCTIVALDISEASE,and so on. This property is called 
transitivity. 
Systematic and predictable rulesfor association and distinction. The rules 
for grouping entities in a class (i.e., creating a species) are determined 
beforehand, as are the rules for creating distinct subclasses (differen- 
tia). Thus all entities in a given class are like each other in some 
predictable (and predetermined) way, and these entities differ from 
entities in sibling classes in some predictable (and predetermined) 
way. In the example above, CONJUNCTIVAL and CORNEALDISEASES 
DISEASES Theyare alike in that they are both kinds of EYEDISEASES. 
are differentiated from each other along some predictable and sys-
tematic criterion of distinction (in this case “part of the eye affected”). 
Mutual exclusivity. A given entity can belong to only one class. This 
property is called mutual exclusivity. 
Necessary and sufficient criteria. In a pure hierarchical classification, 
membership in a given class is determined by rules of inclusion known 
as necessary and sufficientcriteria. To belong to the class, an entity must 
have the prescribed (necessary) attributes; if it has the necessary at- 
tributes, this then constitutes sufficient warrant, and the entity must 
belong to the class. 
Because of these formal properties, hierarchical classification schemes 
continue to have great appeal in knowledge representation and discovery 
for several reasons: 
Complete and comprehensive information. A hierarchical classification is 
usually a fairly comprehensive classification since all rules for aggre- 
gation and distinction must be made a priori. This means that, before 
the structure is established, the designer must know a great deal about 
the extent of the entities, their attributes, and the important criteria 
along which they are similar and different. 
Znheritance and economy ofnotation. The formalism of a hierarchy al- 
lows an economical representation of many complex attributes. Each 
attribute does not have to be repeated at each level but rather is in- 
herited as part of the scheme. Much information can be “carried” by 
the hierarchical structure. 
Inference. For this reason, a hierarchy allows reasoning from incom- 
plete evidence. If it can be established, for instance, that a patient has 
the symptoms of conjunctivitis (as defined by the necessary and suffi- 
cient criteria by which a set of symptoms is given this label), then it is 
possible to know also that, as a kind of eye disease, conjunctivitis will 
share properties with other eye diseases. This is especially useful if 
the shared criteria are not obvious or easily observable. For example, 
if, by observation and comparison with other animals, you assess that 
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an animal is a kind of cat,which is a kind of mammal, you can infer and 
predict that, if it is a female, it will reproduce by bearing live young 
and breast feeding its babies, even though these cat-like characteris- 
tics may not be immediately evident. 
Real definitions. Hierarchical classification enables real definitions, which 
are considered by many to be superior to other types of definitions 
because they provide a way of expressing how an entity is like some-
thing, and also how it is differentin some important way. For instance, 
consider the definition: “Abachelor is an unmarried man.” A bach- 
elor is a man; therefore he shares all the characteristics of men. Men 
can be married or unmarried. A bachelor is of the “unmarried type 
of man. The strength of this definition, as a definition, lies in its 
ability to succinctly describe a complex of attributes of affinity and an 
important aspect of distinction. Two alternative definitional strate- 
gies to real definitions are to list attributes one by one or to point to 
exemplars (“See that guy? He’s a bachelor.” “See that other guy? He’s 
a bachelor too”). A real definition is often the more efficient way of 
describing the nature of the entity and the boundaries of where, by 
definition, that entity ends. 
High-levelview and holistic perspective. If the criteria by which the clas- 
sificatory structure is built are theoretical in the sense that they reveal 
fundamental and meaningful distinctions, then the classification 
scheme as a whole provides a visualization of the phenomena it is 
representing. Such a birdseye perspective enables recognition of over- 
all patterns and anomalies, interesting or problematic relationships, 
and so on. A holistic high-level view is often a trigger for knowledge 
generation, allowing the researcher to step away from the individual 
instances to see them as they fit into a larger context. 
Not every knowledge domain lends itself to being represented by a 
hierarchy, however. While hierarchies are desirable for their economy of 
notation, the richness of description, and the incorporation of knowledge 
about relationships, they are also problematic for a number of reasons: 
Multiple hierarchies. At the top of the list is the fact that, from our 
modern (non-Aristotelian) perspective, we no longer view the world 
as having only one reality-i.e., one way of being parsed neatly at the 
joints. Most phenomena are understood to have several, perhaps over- 
lapping, but separate sets of attributes and relationships, depending 
on the context and goal of the representation. For instance, dogs are 
mammals and knowing they are mammals helps us understand their 
physiological selves. But dogs are also pets and as such belong to the 
domain of domesticated animals and human companions. Knowing 
this aids in understanding the social aspects of dog behavior in a 
particular context, as well as the larger social phenomenon of pet 
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ownership. This suggests that we must have separate classifications 
for “dogs as animals” and “dogs as pets” with perhaps some cross-links 
to show the connections in a tangled, or multihierarchical, structure. 
In any event, no one classification is able to capture all aspects of a 
particular domain. 
Multiple and diverse criteria. There seem to be some practical limits to 
how much information a hierarchy can bear in its structure before it 
becomes too complex. Consider the placement of lions in a classifica- 
tion of animals. Traditional zoological taxonomy, based on morpho- 
logical attributes, places Zions in with other felines. But consider the 
distinction between lions in the wild versus lions in zoos. Are they the 
same entity? A hierarchy is not well designed to accommodate dis- 
tinctions made along two very different sets of criteria. While it is 
possible in theory to further subdivide each animal in a taxonomy of 
animals by whether it is in the wild or in captivity, such a representa-
tion becomes very cumbersome and repetitive. If a hierarchy is 
weighted down by too many perspectives and disparate rules for group- 
ing and differentiation, it loses some of its power as a clear represen- 
tation. One of the difficulties with traditional taxonomies of the liv- 
ing world, in fact, is its inability to accommodate the notion of “habi- 
tat.” The representation of knowledge about living entities in eco- 
logical systems and over time is difficult in a hierarchy that requires 
conformity to the principle of mutual exclusivity. For example, in 
classifying dinosaurs, one must decide whether it is more useful to clus- 
ter a particular dinosaur under the domain of prehistoric creatures (thus 
using “age” as the defining factor) or to separate dinosaurs and clas- 
sify each particular kind under the domain of mammals, birds, reptiles, 
and so on (thus focusing on their attributes as specific types of ani- 
mals rather than on when they lived). To do both simultaneously is 
representationally difficult. 
Lack of complete and comprehensive knowledge. Since hierarchies attempt 
to be comprehensive and to show the relationship of all entities to 
each other in an overall structure, they require relatively complete 
knowledge of the domain in advance. In emerging fields, where the 
extent of the domain is not yet charted, where the relationships are 
not yet fully understood or defined, or where there is no theoretical 
framework on which to build the structure, a hierarchy is both diffi- 
cult and inappropriate to build. It is not just a question of compre- 
hensiveness. If a knowledge domain rushes into a hierarchical repre- 
sentation without adequate grounding or warrant, the result can be a 
representation that is misleading or skewed. Such representations 
can also lead to premature closure in terms of knowledge creation 
because a hierarchy implies clear boundaries and a complete set of 
criteria, while this may not in fact be the case. The sure sign of a 
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“premature” hierarchical structure is the need for a “miscellaneous” 
or “other” category into which the classifier places all those entities 
that do not fit into the logic of the classification system as specified. 
Dz#fermces of scale. In order to maintain the principles of transitivity 
and inheritance, all entities in a hierarchy must be at the same con- 
ceptual level of granularity. For example, in classifying the entity beach, 
it is possible to look at a beach from the global perspective and see “an  
area of demarcation between land and sea,” or from the perspective of a 
human walking on it as “sand, shells, sraweed, etc. ”or through a micro- 
scope as “crystalline structurrs” -same beach, different level of defini- 
tion. Such differences in scale are not easy to accommodate in one 
classification. If combined into one structure, and especially if com- 
bined haphazardly, they weaken the integrity of the knowledge repre- 
sentation. This is because it is not clear at any given point in the 
classification which criteria of association and distinction are being 
invoked: beach as land-mass type, beach as habitat, or beach as physical 
material. 
Lack of transitivity. A hierarchy requires that attributes are passed on 
down the structure intact. So, if A is a subclass of B, and B is a subclass 
of C, then A is also a subclass of C. This neatness does not always 
translate into the way we humans perceive the phenomena around us. 
For example, we might all agree that chairs are a kind of furniture. 
Further, we might agree that rocking chairs, and easy cham, possibly 
stools, and perhaps even tree stumps are a kind of chair-depending on 
the context. But, while most people would agree that a stool is also, 
therefore, a kind of furniture (thus conforming to the principle of tran- 
sitivity), not all people would extend the inheritance and agree that a 
tree stump is a kind of furniture. In other words, somewhere in the 
chain of representation the rules change and not all the attributes of 
furniture get invoked in determining the nature of a tree stump. This 
situation leads to a knowledge representation that subtly shifts. As a 
consequence, it is not possible to use such a representation as a reli- 
able source of inference. 
Rules for class inclusion are too strict. Entities do not always conform to 
the necessary-and-sufficirnt criterion. In a pure hierarchy, entities must 
belong unambiguously to a class. If they possess all the necessary at- 
tributes, they are in; if they lack any of the attributes, they are pre- 
cluded from membership. In a hierarchy, each member of a class is 
therefore as good a representative of its class as any other. Unfortu- 
nately, human beings do not perceive things quite so neatly. Entities 
can belong to a class more or less. The criteria for inclusion might fit 
one entity better than they do another. One entity might be a better 
representative of a class than another. For instance, most people think 
a robin is closer to the prototype of a bird than is a penguin. Put another 
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way, penguins are not unambiguously a member of the bird class, even 
though they may in fact possess all the necessary and sufficient at- 
tributes of bird-ness but not to the same perceived degree as a robin 
does. Furthermore, entities in a class may share some attributes in 
common with each other, but not all might share the same attributes. 
Thus, in my family, there may be a distinctive nose, distinctive eye- 
brows, and a distinctive smile, but not all members must have allthese 
attributes to be perceived as showing a family resemblance. Finally, 
an entity may belong to one class under one set of circumstances, and 
to another class under another set of circumstances, or to both simul- 
taneously. One can be both a parent and a student or sometimes a 
parent and sometimes a .student. It is possible to he sometimes a better 
exemplar of a student (closer to the prototype), while at other times 
less prototypical. This fuzziness requires a different method ofrepre- 
sentation-some mechanism for indicating relative weight and pres- 
ence of attributes and relative closeness or distance from some best- 
example prototype. With permeable membranes and dynamic mem- 
bership in classes, it is difficult to maintain the principles of transitiv-
ity and inheritance. 
In summary, hierarchies are excellent representations for knowledge in 
mature domains in which the nature of the entities, and the nature of 
meaningful relationships, is known. 13ierarchies are useful for entities 
that are well defined and have clear class boundaries. In general, some 
theory or model is necessary to guide the identification of entities, the 
rules of association and distinction, and the order in which these rules are 
invoked: 
Trres. Another type of classificatory structure used to represent entities 
and their relationships is a tree. A tree divides and subdivides its classes 
based on specific rules for distinction just as in a hierarchy but does not 
assume the rules of inheritance. Thus, in a tree, the entities have system- 
atic relationships but not the generic (is-a) relationship. There are many 
types of relationships that can he represented by a tree (see, for example, 
Figure 2 ) .  
GENERAI5 
C O L O N ~ L ~  
CAPIAIN~ 

L I E U I L N A N ~ \  
SEKGL4NT5 
PKIVAI cs 
Figure 2 .  Tree: Chain of Command in the Ai-mv. 
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In this tree, the entities are the names of Army ranks. The relationships 
among the ranks can be described as “chain of command” or “who re- 
ports to whom.” That is, a GENEMI, commands COLONELS, re-COLONELS 
port to GENERALS, commund CAPTAINS,COLONELS and so on. GENERALS 
command PRIVATES is not a as well, although not directly, but a PRIVATE
kind of SERGEANT, is not a kind of LIEUTENANT, and a SERGEANT so the 
principle of division by species/differpntiadoes not apply. Conversely, SER- 
GEANTS do not inherit the attributes of LIEUTENANTS. In terms of knowl- 
edge representation, a tree works well to display a particular relationship 
and the distribution of the entities vis-24s that relationship. This tree 
shows who is on top and who is on the bottom of the chain of command. 
Some inferences can be made about prerogatives and responsibility, but 
only weakly since these inferences are based on pragmatic knowledge and 
not on knowledge that is stored in the structure of the classification itself. 
By knowing something about the domain, it is also possible to guess that 
GENERALS and thus bring “up the ladder” all of the once were PRIVATES 
experiences of going through the ranks, but this is not a formal require- 
ment of the representation either, and may, in fact, be wrong. 
Furthermore, a tree is “flatter” in its representation than is a hierar- 
chy; there is less richness in the representation at each level because there 
is no inheritance or sharing of attributes. For example, there is no indica-
tion of the nature of LIEUTKNANTS-their essence as it were-from their 
position in this classification. In a hierarchy, if‘we know a dogis a mammal, 
we know something about the mammalian attributes of the entity dog 
What are the attributes of a LIEUTENANT that we can learn from the clas- 
sification? Does a LIEUTENANT but has share attributes with a GENERAL 
less of them or different kinds? This type of information is not included 
explicitly. All we can know from this tree is that one rank commands the 
one lower in the pecking order. 
Another kind of tree is one in which the entities are related by the 
partitive relationship. This means that each class is divided into its com- 
ponents, these components into subcomponents, and so on (see, for ex- 
ample, Figure 3) .  
In this example, SYRACUSE which in is part O ONONDAGA COUNTY, 
turn is part of NEWYORK,and so on. The partitive relationship (also known 
as part/whole) is a richer representation than the one shown in Figure 2. 
This is because the principle of inclusion allows more information to be 
shared. For instance, SYRACUSE COUNTY,is not a kind of ONONDAGA so 
what is true of the county as a county is not true for the city in it, but 
SYRACUSE and therefore inherits those at- is part O ONONDAGA COUNTY 
tributes of the county that pertain to all units within it (e.g., location in 
New York State, climate, and so on). This relationship is so rich in repre- 
sentational power, in fact, that in many classification schemes there is 
no distinction made between the purely hierarchical and partitive 
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NORTHAMERICA 
CANADA 
AI,RF:RTA 
+ 
+ 
MEXICO 
+ 
CHJAPAS 
+ 
LTNII.EI) STATES 
ALABAMA 
+ 
+ 
NEW Y O K K  

ONONDAGA
COUNTY 
SYKA(: USE 
t 
+ 
W V o M l N G  
Figure 3. Part/Wliole Relationship 
relationships, and many people refer to both as “hierarchies.” There is 
some psychological support for this, since both pure hierarchies and part/ 
whole classifications convey the notion of going from the more general 
and inclusive to the more specific or elemental. 
Care must be taken, however, in making use of tree representations 
to ensure that the correct attributes are drawn upon in making inferences. 
This problem becomes clearer in another part/whole example (see Fig- 
ure 4). 
AUTOMOBILE 
Bo DY 
ENGINEBLOCK 
PIS rON\  
VAIVES 

I N  I’FRlOR 

+ 
+ 
F i ~ u r e4. Part/Whole Relationshiu. 
VALVESare part ofthe ENGINE BLOCK,but the nature of \!ALVES is distinct 
from the nature of PISTONS,and it would be incorrect to assume (despite 
their sibling position in the classification) that they share many attributes 
in common the way wolves and dogs do. In fact, VALVESand PISTONSare 
not similar entities at all. They share the attribute of being part of the 
ENGINEBLOCK,but that is only a partial explanation of what they are- 
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their essence. It would not be sufficient knowledge for most practical 
purposes the way knowing that dogs and wolves are closely related might 
prove useful. So, trees have the following formal requirements: 
Complete and comprehensiue information. Just like in a hierarchy, the 
entities that will be included in a tree must be decided in advance. 
First, it must be decided what will constitute an entity. Knowledge 
about the entities must be relatively complete in order to decide on 
the scope of the classification and the important criteria of distinc- 
tion. 
Systematic and predictable rules for distinction. The general structure of 
a tree is determined by the relationships among the entities. Part/ 
whole relationships might be appropriate for some knowledge, while 
other relationships (such as cause/effect; starting point/outcome; 
process/product; and so on) might be appropriate for other types of 
knowledge representation. These relationships should be ones that 
best reveal the knowledge of the domain-that is, the way in which all 
the entities interact with each other. 
Citation order. In both hierarchies and trees it is important to decide 
the order in which rules of distinction will be invoked. The most im- 
portant of these decisions is the “first cut” because this determines 
the shape and eventually the representational eloquence of the classi- 
fication. If the first cut is a trivial one, the rest of the tree becomes 
awkward and does not reflect knowledge very well. For example, in 
the biological classification of animals (a hierarchy), the first cut is: 
has a backbone/does not have a backbone (vertebrate/invertebrate). While 
this cut produces a very skewed distribution in terms of numbers of 
species (there are many times more invertebrate species than verte- 
brates), the resulting classification proceeds smoothly down the sub- 
divisions and is able to cluster many attributes that “make sense” with 
respect to what we know about fundamental qualities of animals. In 
trees, the determination of an appropriate citation order is all the 
more important because trees are essentially descriptive, and the pic- 
ture they present will depend on the first branching. For instance, in 
the AUTOMOBILE example presented above, it would be possible to 
make the first division BACKOF CAR/FRONT OF CAR,OF CAR/MIDDLE 
and proceed to decompose those sections into their component parts. 
But would this make sense? Would it present a reasonable division of 
an automobile’s components? Would it help us with knowledge about 
cars? Perhaps for someone in some context. There is no easy answer 
to what constitutes a meaningful division, and the decision often rests 
on consensual models or tradition. 
Trees are useful knowledge representations for the following reasons: 
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Highlight/Display relationship of interest. This is the primary strength of 
a tree. It lays out the entities comprising a domain in a pattern of 
classes that highlights or makes evident the important or defining re- 
lationships among them. 
Distance. A tree reveals the distances between entities (either physical 
distances or metaphorical ones). Thus one can determine that a COLO-
NEL is “closer” to a GENFXAL at least along the di- than is a PRIVATE, 
mension of chain of command. If entities are components of the 
sanie super component, this means they are “closer” in space or in 
function. 
Relativefiequency of entities. This feature of trees is also shared by hier- 
archies. When entities cluster in large numbers under one classifica- 
tion label, this is frequently an opportunity for the creation or discov- 
ery of new rules for distinguishing among them. When a cluster is 
small and has only a few7 entities, these entities tend to be treated as if 
they were all the saine. It  may be neither feasible nor reasonable to 
make distinctions among them, and taking account of any differences 
may not support the enterprise. Once the cluster grows, however, 
and the number of entities reaches a critical mass, it might be usefd 
to further differentiate them. In such a case it is necessary to discover 
new knowledge that will suggest the best way of making these finer 
distinctions. Conversely when a category consistently has a member 
of one orjust a few, it might signal the need for merging categories 
and rethinking the logic behind the division in the first place. In this 
case also, i t  is necessary to generate new knowledge in order to guide 
the merging or shifting ofthe orphan categories. 
The use of trees as knowledge representations shares some of’the same 
problems as does the use of hierarchies: 
Rigidity. Because a tree is characterized by the relationships among 
entities and the citation order, the general shape of the tree-’ its ex-
pressiveness as a knowledge representation-is determined a priori. 
This means that new entities can he added, if they fit into a place in 
the structure but, if the new entity or new knowledge does not fit well, 
the entire structure must be rethought and sometimes rebuilt. 
one-wayflow of information. In a hierarchy, information flows in two 
directions: vertically, between classes, superclasses, and subclasses, and 
also laterally, between sibling classes (classes sharing the same super- 
class). In a tree, even if it is a part/whole representation, the infor- 
mation flows in a vertical direction up and down. Siblings in a class 
may in fact be entirely different types ofobjects. So there are rides for 
species but not for dflueentia. Many people assume that, since Syracuse 
is in New York State and New York City is also in New York State, that 
they are similar when in fact they only share the attribute of being in 
KWASNIK/THE ROLE OF CLASSIFICATION 35 
the same state and little else. Syracuse may be more like some other 
city in another state than it is like New York City. At any rate, the tree 
classification is not particularly good at representing multidirectional 
complex relationships. 
Selective perspective. As with hierarchies, by emphasizing a certain rela- 
tionship, a tree can mask, or fail to reveal, other equally interesting 
relationships. For instance, in the Army ranks example, the only rela- 
tionship available to us is the “who commands whom” relationship. It 
does not touch upon the relationship of ranks when in combat, for 
instance, as opposed to the relationships among ranks of troops sta- 
tioned at home. It does not show the distribution of men to women in 
the various ranks, or the distribution of ethnic or racial groups, and so 
on. It is completely silent on the classification of functional jobs in 
the Army (such as nurses, quartermasters, and so on). In other words, 
there are many other perspectives or lenses through which one could 
“know” the Army. The typology of ranks based on who commands 
whom is but one of them. 
In summary, trees are useful for displaying information about entities 
and their relationships along one dimension of interest. They require 
fairly complete knowledge about a domain or at least about one aspect of 
a domain. A tree representation is good for displaying the relative place- 
ment of entities with respect to each other and their frequency at any 
node. On the other hand, trees are limited in how much they can repre- 
sent, especially in terms of knowledge about entities within the same class. 
Furthermore, trees allow only partial inference. 
Paradigms. A third classificatory structure is one in which entities are de- 
scribed by the intersection of two attributes at a time. The resulting ma- 
trix (or paradigm) reveals the presence or absence and the nature of the 
entity at the intersection (see Figure 5). 
In this representation, we see two axes. The vertical has headings 
designating gender; the horizontal, types of kinship relationships. The 
cells represent the labels or names for this intersection of gender and 
kinship relationship. In this example, we have combined two such para- 
digms: one in English and one in Polish. You could imagine each one 
standing on its own but, for purposes of comparison, we have superim- 
posed one on the other. Paradigms have the following formal require- 
ments: 
Two-wayhierarchicalrelationship. Each cell entity (in this case the label 
signifying a kinship relationship) is related to both the vertical and 
the horizontal axis by a generic relationship. For instance, a Mother is 
a Female, and a Mother is a Parent. Across the row, all the entities are 
related to each other in being a subclass of the row header. So,fathers, 
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brothers, uncles, cousins, and fathers-in-law are all males. Entities in col- 
umns are related to each other by being in the same subclass. So, 
uncles and aun,ts are both sibling~sof parents. There is a shallow hierar- 
chy running in both directions. However, entities are not related to 
each other in a generic relationship. Thus a mother is not a kind of 
father nor do they inherit properties from each other. 
Axes represent two attributes of interest. Each axis represents one attribute 
that might serve to describe the entities in a meaningful way. In the 
example, the two axes represent “the sex of theperson”and “the way the 
person is related.” The interesting feature of a paradigm is that it af-
fords us a view of the entities classified along two dimensions at once. 
Cells may be empty or may have more than one entity. Paradigms not only 
show us the intersection of two attributes, but also show us the pres- 
ence, absence, and frequency of entities at these intersections. 
So, how do we use this classificatory structure to represent and create 
knowledge? 
Naming. Paradigms are frequently used in the study of terminology. 
As mentioned in a previous section, hierarchies enable the creation 
of strong definitions, but paradigms allow the study of patterns of nam- 
ing. When people name things, they are creating an abstraction by 
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incorporating a complex set of attributes under one label. Objects 
that are quite different in many ways but share defining attributes 
may still be given the same name. For instance, animals with a wide 
range of physical attributes are labeled dog if they share the defining 
attributes. Or, when we call something a hamburger,we may include 
under this rubric many slightly different kinds of sandwiches. They 
may have lettuce, or a slice of onion, or ketchup, or not; they may be 
small or large, but if they have a beef patty and a bun they are named 
hamburger. Now, if you add a slice of cheese, the name changes. Two 
hamburgers that are quite similar with respect to lettuce, tomato, on- 
ion, ketchup, and even sesame seeds, will still be named differently if 
one has a slice of American cheese. Naming will vary according to 
context, region, profession, and so on. So terminology indicates clas- 
sificatory decisions, and paradigms serve as descriptive displays of terms 
as well as tools for analysis. 
Distinction and lack of distinction. Paradigms can show the extent to 
which the intersecting criteria have distinct terms. In our example, 
we see that English has a single label for all the relationships displayed, 
while Polish has two terms each for uncles and aunts, and four terms 
for cousins, depending on whether they are related through the mother 
or father. So, in English, there is no distinction at all between cousins, 
and only a gender distinction between labels for your parents’ sib- 
lings. Furthermore, besides being distinguished by side of the family, 
cousins in Polish are not completely distinguished from siblings and 
are given names that have the same root term as do brothers and sisters. 
Patterns of similarity and d$jbmce. In terms of knowledge creation, 
paradigms often provide a heuristic tool for the discovery of regular- 
ity in the patterns of distinction. When distinctions are made in nam- 
ing (that is, when people create different labels for concepts), we as- 
sume that the criterion for having made that distinction is important 
in some way. In this case, the distinction of relationship through ei- 
ther the mother’s or father’s side is important in Polish. Conversely, 
while English has distinct terms for cousins and siblings, Polish uses 
similar terms for both, distinguishing only by gender. The knowledge 
conveyed is that, even though each culture has a great deal of overlap 
in equivalent terminology, there are some subtle differences that may 
have historical or other explanations. In fact, it is interesting to note 
that the Polish distinction between aunts and uncles from different 
sides is fading. Did English once have such distinctions? Does this 
indicate the cultures are merging? 
Empty cells. Empty cells in a paradigm provide an opportunity to inves- 
tigate the reasons for the lack of a term. Does the absence of a term 
indicate the absence of a concept or does it indicate that the criteria 
chosen for the axes are not meaningful ones? Does every language, 
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for instance, have the notion of a “kissing cousin?” Why is there no 
female equivalent of mzsogynist? 
The limitations of paradigms a5 knowledge representation and dis- 
covery tools are as follows: 
Requires knowledge of domain. The expressiveness of a paradigm relies 
on the felicitous choice of the attributes represented on the two axes. 
The fidelity of the picture that a paradigm reveals can be compro- 
mised if the dimensions are trivial and do not reflect fundamental 
concepts. In our example, the axes are chosen from concepts well 
established in the field of cultural anthropology: kinship expressed 
through blood and marriage, as well as distinctions made by gender. 
Paradigms that use dimensions guided by theory or a model usually 
do a better job of reflecting knowledge in the domain because they 
rest on a consensual framework of description. In other words, they 
are using a common vocabulary for communication. In fields where 
the fundamental relationships or concepts are not well understood, it 
is difficult to build a paradigm that reveals essential knowledge. 
Limited perspective. While a well-chosen set of dimensions may pro- 
duce a valid description, it also produces a filter that limits the scope 
of what might be seen. So, in the example, kinship terms are ex- 
pressed using blood/marriage relationships and gender as dimensions 
of distinction. To us these distinctions seem self-explanatory and al- 
most universal, but in fact they are artifacts of our own cultural as- 
sumptions that we then impose on our observations of the world. 
Consider, for instance, that the dimensions do not address other fam- 
ily bonds, such as those that are based on strong affinity, legal adop- 
tion, and other socially invented forms of kinship. Nor do they allow 
for other cultural definitions of the entities themselves, such as alter- 
native views of what constitutes a parent. Thus, the paradigm presented 
in the example is a view through a particular lens. Another set of 
dimensions would present a different view and would most likely pro- 
duce different analytical outcomes. 
Limited explanatory power. Because paradigms invoke dimensions only 
in pairs, they (like most classificatory structures) rarely produce a com- 
plete picture of a phenomenon. While paradigms do use the poten- 
tially rich representation of a hierarchical relationship vertically and 
horizontally, in a paradigm this relationship is shallow-only one 
deep-and therefore not very complex. For this reason, paradigms 
are essentially descriptive. They help clarify; they may suggest patterns 
and anomalies, but these patterns are not inherent to the structure 
and must be interpreted by the person using the paradigm. 
In summary, paradigms are good tools for discovery. They reveal the pres- 
ence or absence of names for entities defined by pairs of attributes. They 
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can be used for comparison and for the display of patterns and anomalies 
with respect to the variety and distribution of terms. Paradigms are heu- 
ristic in that they present a clear view that can then be analyzed and inter- 
preted. Like most classificatory structures, paradigms require knowledge 
of the domain or some guiding principles in order to make a good choice 
of dimensions and, like most classificatory structures, paradigms are usu- 
ally partial and biased representations. 
Faceted Analysis. Faceted classifications are not really a different represen- 
tational structure but rather a different approach to the classification pro- 
cess. rhe notion of facets rests on the belief that there is more than one 
way to view the world, and that even those classifications that are viewed 
as stable are in fact provisional and dynamic. The challenge is to build 
classifications that are flexible and can accommodate new phenomena. 
Faceted classification has its roots in the works of S.R. Ranganathan, 
an Indian scholar, who posited that any complex entity could be viewed 
from a number of perspectives or fawts. He suggests that these fimda- 
mental categories are Personality, Matter, Energy, Space, and Time 
(Ranganathan, 1967). Over the years, Ranganathan’s facets have been 
reinterpreted in many contexts, but it is surprising how well they have 
weathered the test of time. They have been used to classify objects as 
disparate as computer software (for reuse), patents, books, and art ob- 
jects (Kwasnik, 1992a). 
Not all faceted classifications use Ranganathan’s prescribed funda- 
mental categories, but what they do have in common is the process of 
analysis. 
Penod/Stvle Place Procesc Material Obiect 
IsthCentury 
Arts & Crafts 
Japanese 
American 
rdku ceramic 
oak 
vase 
desk 
Figure 6. ,4 Faceted Analvsis of Artifacts. 
Figure 6 shows a possible solution to the classification of material cul- 
ture which, in its diversity, defies easy description and categorization. For 
purposes of demonstration, this is a simplified version of the one used by 
the Art  and Architecture Thesaurus. For any given artifact, there are many 
possible ways of representing it, let alone the “knowledge” that enabled 
its production or its value. The faceted approach follows these steps: 
Choosefacets. Decide, in advance, on the important criteria for de-
scription. These form the facets or fundamental categories. In this 
case we have Period, Place, Process, Material, and Object, following 
closely on what Ranganathan suggested. 
Develop facets. Each facet can be developed/expanded using its own 
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logic and warrant and its own classificatory structure. For example, 
the Period facet can be developed as a timeline; the Materials facet 
can be a hierarchy; the Place facet a part/whole tree, and so on. 
Analyze entities using the facets. In analyzing an entity, choose descrip- 
tors from the appropriate facets to form a string, as shown above. Thus, 
the classification string for object 1 is “19‘”Century Japanese raku ce- 
ramic vase.” The string for object 2 is “Arts & Crafts American oak 
desk.” It is important to note that the process is not one of diui~ion(as 
in a hierarchy) where the entities are subdivided into ever more spe- 
cifically differentiated categories. It is not a process of decomposition 
either (as in a part/whole tree), in which the entities are broken down 
into component parts, each part different from the whole. Instead, 
the process of analysis is to view the object from all its angles-same 
object but seen from different perspectives. So, in the example, the 
vase can be seen from the point of view of its period, the place in 
which it was made, the material and processes, and so on. 
Develop citation order. In organizing the classified objects, choose a 
primary facet that will determine the main attribute and a citation 
order for the other facets. This step is not required and applies only 
in those situations where a physical (rather than a purely intellectual) 
organization is desired. 
The development of a faceted approach has been a great boon to classifi- 
cation because it meshes well with our modern sensibilities about how the 
world is organized. Specifically, it is a useful tool because it: 
Does not require complete knowledge. In building a faceted scheme, it is 
not necessary to know either the full extent of the entities to be ac- 
commodated by the scheme nor the full extent of the relationships 
among the facets. It is thus particularly useful in new and emerging 
fields or in fields that are changing. 
Hospitable. When a classification is hospitable it means it can accom- 
modate new entities smoothly. In a faceted scheme, if the fundamen- 
tal categories are sound, new entities can be described and added. 
This is particularly important in the classification of objects such as 
cultural artifacts, where we have no way of predicting the things that 
will be produced by the human imagination. If an artifact produced 
100years from now could be described by the fundamental categories 
of period, place, material, process, and object, then the classification 
scheme will still be robust. 
flexibility. Since a faceted scheme describes each object by a number 
of independent attributes, these attributes can be invoked in an end- 
lessly flexible way in a sort of Leg0 approach. “Let me see all the iron 
objects made in 17*-century Scotland.” “OK, now all the copper ob- 
jects.” “OK,now iron objects in Italy.. .”. This flexibility can be used to 
KWASNIK/THE ROLE OF CLASSIFICATION 41 
discover new and interesting associations. The approach is called post-
coordination and means that attributes can be mixed and matched at 
the time of retrieval. It is in contrast to the pre-coordinatedcategories 
that are a requirement of most hierarchies in which the rules for class 
inclusion are invoked at the time the entity is classified and stay fixed 
from there on. 
Expressiveness. A faceted approach can be more expressive because 
each facet is free to incorporate the vocabulary and structure that 
best suits the knowledge represented by that facet. 
Does not require a strong theory. Since a faceted classification does not 
have an overall structure, it does not have to have a “theoretical glue” 
to hold it together and to guide the rules for association and distinc- 
tion. It can be constructed ad hoc so long as the fundamental catego- 
ries function well. 
Can accommodate a variety of theoretical structures and models. A faceted 
approach makes it possible to represent a variety of perspectives as 
well. For instance, in facet analyzing a piece of literature, one facet 
may reflect a particular model of genres, another a model of languages, 
and so on. In a traditional hierarchy, it may be extremely difficult or 
impossible to blend the two, while a faceted scheme allows them to co- 
exist. 
Multipleperspectives. One of the most useful features of a faceted ap- 
proach is that it allows entities to be viewed from a variety of perspec- 
tives-a feature that is lacking in hierarchies and trees. In a faceted 
analysis, it is possible to describe a dog as an animal, as a pet, as food, as 
a commodity, and ad infinitum, so long as the fundamental categories 
have been established with which to do this. 
While the flexibility and pragmatic appeal of faceted classifications have 
made this a popular approach, there are some limitations in terms of knowl- 
edge representation and creation: 
Dificulty of establishing appropriate facets. The strength of a faceted 
classification lies in the fundamental categories, which should express 
the important attributes of the entities being classified. Without knowl- 
edge of the domain and of the potential users, this is often difficult to 
do. While it is possible to flexibly add entities, it is not a simple matter 
to add fundamental facets once the general classification is established. 
Lack of relationships amongfacets. Most faceted classifications do not do 
a good job of connecting the various facets in any meaningful way. 
Each facet functions as a separate kingdom, as it were, without much 
guidance as to how to put the parts together. For example, to facet 
analyze motion pictures by genre, country, director, film process, and so 
on, we would still have no insight as to the meaningful relationships 
of, say, a particular country and the popular film genre there or of a 
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particular film process arid the genres it supports. In terms oftheoriz- 
ing and model building, the faceted classification serves as a useful 
and multidimensional description but does not explicitly connect this 
description in an explanatory framework. 
Dzj‘j5iculty ofvisualization. A hierarchy or a tree, and especially a para- 
digm, can be visually displayed in such a way that the entities arid 
their relationships are made evident. This is difficult to do for a fac- 
eted classification, especially if each facet is structured using a differ- 
ent internal logic. As a result, faceted schemes can only be viewed 
along one or t\vo dimensions at a time, even though a more complex 
representation is actually incorporated into the descriptive strings. 
Thus it is difficult to see a vase in the context of other vases, of other 
Japanese artifacts, of other clay objects, of other raku objects, and so 
on, all at the same tima 
Nevertheless, faceted schemes continue to flourish because we recognize 
that they allow at least some systematic way of viewing the world without 
the necessity for a mature and stable internal framework in which to view 
it. Information technology has promise for new ways of enabling multidi- 
mensional visualizatioii and for developing computer-assisted ways of dis- 
covering patterns and anomalies that can possibly lead to new knowledge. 
CLASSIFICATIONA D KNOWLEDGE 
There are many ways in which classification schemes and knowledge 
interact. Sometimes the interaction is so harmonious that the two remain 
linked for a long time. Sometimes knowledge changes and the classifica- 
tion must also change or knowledge changes and the classification is no 
longer adequate to the task. Sometimes the classification itself generates 
new knowledge. The following discussion is representative of ways in which 
knowledge and classifications niutually interact. 
Chanffin,gExplanatorj Frmneworks 
The Periodic Table of Elements, attributed to Mendeleyev, is an ex- 
ample of a classification scheme that has endured through several ex- 
planatory Frameworks. When the Periodic Table was first proposed, there 
was already a body of knowledge about individual elements-i.e., facts 
and observations, including the knowledge of atomic weight. It was ob-
served that elements could be arranged in a systematic order according to 
atomic weight, and this would show a periodic change of properties. This 
early Periodic Table proved to be a very useful tool, leading to the discov- 
ery of new elements and a new understanding of already known elements. 
In terms of theory, the Table “so di\ide[d] its subject matter that it [could] 
enter into many and important true propositions about the subject mat- 
ter...” (Kaplan,1963,p. 50). The rule for determining one element from 
another was atomic weight, a basically descriptive criterion, but it was not 
KWASNIK/THE ROLE OF CLASSIFICATION 43 
until the discovery of atomic theory that the periodicity of the table was 
fully understood. This theory explained (rather than merely described) 
the underlying principles behind the regularity and pattern of the classi- 
fied entities. With this new explanation, many new properties could be 
inferred. The table became a predictive tool for as yet undiscovered ele- 
ments as well as an explanatory tool and a very fruitful descriptive tool. It 
reflected well what was already known about elements and pointed to new 
knowledge (such as the common characteristics of inert gases). What is 
interesting is that the original Periodic Table did not have to undergo 
fundamental changes in structure even though a new explanatory frame- 
work was discovered. 
Changes in Perspective 
Technological advances in measuring and viewing instruments have 
had a profound influence on classifications. This is because new instru- 
ments reveal new knowledge that does not always fit neatly into existing 
knowledge representation structures. Such instruments have included 
carbon dating, the electron microscope, DNA testing, remote sensing, 
and so on. For instance, clouds were traditionally very simply classified by 
shape and by height from the horizon. This classification was developed 
when we could only see clouds from our perspective standing on the earth. 
Now we can measure the moisture, temperature, particulate matter, and 
charge of a cloud. Moreover, clouds can be observed from a satellite 
thereby observing global patterns. We know about the typical life cycle of 
a cloud-how clouds change shape and identity. This new understanding 
of clouds has a profound impact on weather forecasting, navigation, and 
other fields of knowledge, yet the traditional classification is robust as a 
simple and clear form of communication. It remains very popular and co- 
exists with new classifications. 
Sometimes the new way of observation yields a new classification. For 
instance, gems used to be classified on a scale of hardness (with diamonds 
at one end and chalk at the other) and also by color. These attributes 
were visible to the naked eye. Once it was possible to view gems through 
a microscope, it was then necessary, or at least more useful, to alter this 
classification to include knowledge about crystalline structure. 
ChangingEntities 
Sometimes, though, changes in the way we can observe have led to 
fundamental changes not only in the classificatory structures but also in 
the nature of the entities themselves. For instance, a complex problem 
exists in trying to coordinate traditional ways of describing natural habi- 
tats with new ways of observation and measurement. Formerly, scientists 
spoke in terms of rainfall, temperature, growth forms, dominant life forms, 
and so on. These attributes were described and classified according to 
whatever model predominated or was accepted and resulted in such 
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constructs as deserts, tropical rainforpsts, and so on. But today the mapping 
of natural habitats is done by remote sensing data that measure a differ-
ent kind of unit such as reflectance, texture, density, spatial patterns, slope, 
Leaf Area Index, and so on (Muchoney, 1994)-that is, each of these pa- 
rameters does not necessarily correspond to something (an entity) that 
we can unambiguously call “a tree” or a “a camel.” Remote sensing data 
do not require a semantically coherent entity to be the cause of measure- 
ment. All that matters is that measurements can be taken and this mea- 
surement can then be combined, clustered, and analyzed with other mea- 
surements to yield “types.” Put another way, the resulting entities are not 
semantically meaningful in the same way as traditional names. The prob- 
lem arises in communication about the habitats and also in theorizing 
about them-i.e., in making sense of the phenomena. 
Another example of changing entities within a domain has occurred 
in the classification of musical instruments. Instruments are classified 
basically by material and the method of producing sound (striking, blow 
ing, bowing, strumming, and so on). This classification did quite well 
with a few slight adjustments here and there for hybrid instruments, but it 
hit a real snag with the introduction of electronic instruments such as 
synthesizers. The problem lies not so much in squeezing the newcomer 
categories into the old scheme but rather in how well the old criteria fit 
the new entities as meaningful guides for association and discrimination. 
This situation is a classic example of shifts that occur only occasionally at 
first but might eventually lead to a complete overhaul of the classification 
or perhaps to the creation of two parallel classifications. 
Classzfications Built When There is No Consensus 
Many classifications must be built when there is no generally accepted 
theory or model on which to construct or to define the entities. For ex- 
ample, the classification of mental disorders is mandated economically by 
insurance companies and legal requirements. Social institutions require 
that we be able to determine who is legally sane, who must be confined to 
care, and who will be reimbursed for services. This classification is there- 
fore built on factors that are not based on any particular theory of mental 
illness or mental processes but rather on readily observable syniptoms and 
behaviors. It is therefore only a moderately good descriptive tool and an 
almost useless tool for understanding fundamental processes from any 
theoretically coherent perspective. Thus, the classification fails to act as a 
heuristic device by generating provocative questions or providing inter- 
esting insights. 
Classifications Where There are No L’nij?ofOrm or Stable Entities 
Scientists have long been struggling with a classification of smells. 
While we are able to construct useful classifications of colors based on 
what we know about the physics of light, the psychology and aesthetics of 
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color and the human ability to perceive and use colors, we have not had 
the same success with smells. We are forced to refer to smells using analo- 
gies: fruity, citrus, gwen, floral, putrid, and so on. One of the problems is 
that there is no “unit” of smell, no building block that could then be classed 
and differentiated in some systematic way. This lack of a classification has 
led to reliance on the essentially subjective artistry of individuals with re- 
spect to the identification, blending, and general understanding of smell. 
This does not mean that we do not know how smell works in terms of 
perception. Nor does it mean that we do not understand the powerful 
nature of smell in human life, but the fact remains that we have no good 
way of talking about smells as smells. 
A similar problem arises in the classification of viruses. This is not 
because viruses do not exist as entities but, rather, because they change 
and are never in a form unambiguous enough to be pinned down by a 
clear classification. 
The Intersection of Theory and Economic Interests 
Classifications are never created in a political or social vacuum. Ev-
eryone is familiar with the old Department of Agriculture classification of 
food groups: meats, dairy and eggs, grains, fruits and vegetables, and fats. 
From a classification point of view, the dairy and eggs category always 
seemed a rather odd one in that it is not clear on what basis dairy prod- 
ucts and eggs go together, nor along which dimension they are distin- 
guished from the other categories. It is not by source (animals) nor by 
nutritional component (protein). Furthermore, the classification does 
not indicate the relative importance of each group. “At least one from 
each” was the slogan. As it turns out, the classification was the result of a 
strong lobby by the dairy industry. It is amazing how well established this 
classification became and how long it persisted. The new classification is 
really quite elegant. It builds a pyramid with grains on the bottom and 
fats on the top. Dairy and eggs now share a level with meats. This new 
classification reflects modern nutritional science much more coherently. 
It not only classes the foods according to some understandable criteria, 
but also indicates, by the narrowing pyramidal shape, the relative amount 
of foods from each of the groups that should be consumed. This classifi- 
cation may, as it turns out some day, reflect faulty scientific knowledge, 
but at least it reflects it with fidelity and clarity. 
Keys and Other “Thin”Classzfications 
A key is a classification that is built using an easily identifiable, but 
not necessarily theoretical, set of criteria. One example is a field guide to 
flowers. In such a guide, flowers are classed first by their petal color. Petal 
color is a characteristic that is easy to identify but is trivial when compared 
to more fundamentally meaningful attributes of a flower such as plant 
structure or reproductive mechanisms. The petal color yields relatively 
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little fundamental knowledge of the flower, but petals are an easy way to 
narrow the field of possibilities, especially for the novice. A key, there- 
fore, allows easy entry into a deeper classification. However, consider the 
classification of baseball in the Dewey Decimal Classification in Figure 7. 
796 Athletic and outdoor sports and games 
796.3 Ball games 
796.35 Ball driven by club, mallet, bat 
796.357 Baseball 
Figure 7. Dewey Decimal Classification of' Baseball. 
This scheme positions baseball, along with other ball games in which a 
ball is hit with a mallet, club, or bat, right next to field hockey and croquet 
as well as polo. This is not an inaccurate classification. There are no 
factual errors, as it were, but by using the ball and the bat as the defining 
criteria, the classification is reduced to a very thin representation of what 
baseball is. It does not address any of the team aspects; the cultural as-
pects; or the aesthetic, athletic, economic, strategic, or spiritual aspects of 
baseball as a sport. Why? Because this is difficult to do, and there is no 
consensus really of what these attributes might be or how they might be 
expressed. There is no generally accepted theory of games or sports, but 
we can all readily agree that yes, indeed, in baseball you hit a ball with a 
bat. In this case, the classification is structured like a key but does not 
lead to a deeper theoretical representation of baseball in all its complex- 
ity. 
CONCLUSION 
Classification is a way of seeing. Phenomena of interest are repre- 
sented in a context of relationships that, at their best, function as theories 
by providing description, explanation, prediction, heuristics, and the gen- 
eration of new questions. Classifications can be complex or simple, loaded 
with information or rather stingy in what they can reveal. They can re- 
flect knowledge elegantly and parsimoniously, or they can obfuscate and 
hinder understanding. Some classifications enable flexible manipulation 
of knowledge for the purposes of discovery; some are rigid and brittle, 
barely able to stand up under the weight of new knowledge. It is useful to 
understand the properties of various classification structures so we can 
exploit their strengths and work around the weaknesses. In the future, 
classification will be enhanced by new methods of revealing patterns, as-
sociations, and structures of knowledge, and by new ways of visualizing 
them. 
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NOTES 
’ Some of the ideas in this article were first described in a paper presented at the Third 
ASIS SIG/CR Workshop on Classification Research, Pittshurgh, PA, 1992 (Kwasnik, 
l992b).
’ Adapted from an example in Aitchison,Jean and Gilchrist, Alan (eds.). (1987). Thesau-
rus construction, 2“ ed. London, England: Aslib, p. 80. 
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